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NOTES.
AGENCY-CONSTRUCTIVE

KNOWLEDGE

OF

THE

PRINCIPAL.-

Knowledge acquired by an agent before the existence of the relation of agency does not constitute constructive knowledge of the
principal; but it may be put in evidence to show actual knowledge
on the part of the principal, under the presumption that an agent
will impart to his principal, at the time of entering into the relation, what knowledge he then has of the subject-matter of the
agency. But this presumption may be rebutted.'
There are two views as to the reason for imputing to the
principal knowledge of facts of which his agent has knowledge.
One theory is that the principal and agent are one and the same
in the eye of the law, so far as the agency is concerned; the other
is that the agent is presumed to have communicated to his principal
what information he has bearing on the relation existing between
them.2 Under the first theory, namely, that the principal and agent
are identical so far as relates to the subject-matter of the agency,
it is clear that any information which the agent may have acquired
before he became connected with the principal cannot be imputed
'Hall & Brown Wood Working Mach. Co. v. Haley Furniture & Mfg.
Co. et a., 56 So. Rep. 726 (Ala. 1911).
31 Cyc. 1593; Mechem, The Law of Agency, Sec. 719.
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to the latter, for the reason that, as stated by Mr. Justice Sharswood
in Houseman v. Girard Mutual Building and Loan Association,' "it
is only during the agency that the agent represents, and stands in
the shoes of, his principal. Notice to him is then notice to his
principal. Notice to him twenty-four hours before the relation commenced is no more notice than twenty-four hours after it had
ceased, would be."
This view of the reason for holding that the principal has notice
of facts within the knowledge of his agent, and which necessarily
restricts the notice to that acquired during the agency, has been
adopted in some other jurisdictions, 4 but the second theory mentioned represents the great weight of authority. 5 To it there are,
however, certain qualifications which, with the general rule itself,
are thus stated by Professor Mechem: 6 "The law imputes to the
principal, and charges him with, all notice or knowledge relating to
the subject-matter of the agency, which the agent acquires or obtains
while acting as such agent and within the scope of his authority,
or which he may previously have acquired, and which he then had
in mindJ or which he had acquired so recently as to reasonably
warrant the assumption that he still retained it; 8 provided, however, that such notice or knowledge will not be imputed (i) where
'81 Pa. 256 (1876). Approved in Barbour v. Wiehle, z16 Pa. 308 (1887),
and in Lightcap v. Nicola, 34 Pa. Super. 189 (1907).
'Congar v. Chic. & N. W. R. R. Co., 24 Wis. 157 (1869); Advertiser
& Tribune Co. v. Detroit. 43 Mich. 116 (i88o) ; dictum in Farmers and Citizens' Bank v. Payne, 25 Conn. 444 (1857).
Bank of U. S. v. Davis, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 451 (1842) is frequently cited
in support of this view, and as showing that the New York courts adopt
it; but this is unwarranted. It is true that in the opinion it is said, "The
principal is chargeable with this knowledge for the reason that the agent
is substituted in his place, and represents him in the particular transaction;
and as this relation, strictly speaking, exists only while the agent is acting in'
the business thus delegated to him, it is proper to limit it to such occasions!
But the actual decision is that knowledge acquired by a director before the
meeting at which action was taken, at which time only, according to the
court, was the director acting as the agent of the bank, might be charged
to the bank upon proof that he was present and acted at the meetinz. This
case, and later decisions in the same state seem to have taken the anomalous
position of holding that, while the reason that the principal is considered
to have notice of facts known to his agent is that they are in law identical, yet knowledge acquired by the agent before the relation was entered
into may be imputed to the principal. Craigie v. Hadley, 99 N. Y. 131 (885);
Constant et aL v. Univ. of Rochester, iII N. Y. 604 (1889).
'Frenkel v. Hudson, 82 Ala. 158 (1886), by way of dictum; Day v.
Wamsley, 33 Ind. 145 (187o); Pritchett and Allen v. Sessions, io Rich.
(S. C.) 293 (1857); The Distilled Spirits, i Wall. (U. S.) 367 (187o);
Dresser v. Norwood, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 466 (1864); Chouteau v. Allen, 70
Mo. 290 (1879) ; Suit v. Woodhall, II3 Mass. 391 (1873); Fairfield Savings
Bank v. Chase, 72 Me. 226 (i881).
'The Law of Agency, Sec. 721.
'Wittenbrock v. Parker, 1O2 Cal. g3 (i894); Fairfield Savings Bank v.
Chase, supra.
' Chouteau v. Allen, supra.
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it is such as it is the agent's duty not to disclose," and (2) where
the agent's relations to the subject-matter, or his previous conduct,
render it certain that he will not disclose it,1O and (3) where the
person claiming the benefit, or those whom he represents, colluded
with the agent to cheat or defraud the principal." 1
It will be seen that, under either view, the principal is chargeable with notice of facts coming to the knowledge of his agent during the agency. The difference arises when the agent's knowledge
is acquired prior to the establishment of the relation. In the present
case 12 the court adopted the first theory as to knowledge acquired
by the agent during the agency, but a modification of the second as
to knowledge obtained by him before the agency began. In other
words, the principal is conclusively bound by notice received by
the agent during the relationship, but is only presumed to know
what the agent learned before it; and this presumption, which is
based on the further presumption that the agent communicated to
him what he had previously learned, may be rebutted by showing
that such communication was not actually made. Under the second
theory, as generally adopted, it will be remembered that, with the
exceptions noted by Mr. Mechem, the principal is just as much
bound by knowledge acquired by his agent before the agency, as
by that acquired during it. The court in the case under review
admitted that this view is supported by the weight of authority,
but thought it wrong, and adhered to the rule, which it said is
established by the Alabama cases, namely, that there is only a
presumption of knowledge on the part of the principal, of facts
known to the agent before the relation was established; and that
this may be rebutted by showing that the principal did not in fact
have the knowledge. It is interesting to note that the decisions
in that state have not all taken this view of the subject,1 3 and that
the court in the present case found it necessary to explain several,
and overrule one, which was decided but a few years earlier, and
3
which adopted the second theory without the modification.'
It must be admitted that it is not desirable to have a general
rule surrounded by a large number of exceptions; but where there
are only a few necessary qualifications, the result may very well
be better both as conforming to established legal principles, and as
being more efficacious in working out justice, than in the case of
a single rule which does not cover the ground. Obviously the doctrine of the case under discussion is open to the objection that it
is necessarily very difficult, if not impossible, in many cases, to prove
"The Distilled Spirits, supra; dictum in Bank v. Chase, supra.
"Innerarity v. Bank, 139 Mass. 332 (1885).
'National Life Ins. Co. v. Minch, 53 N. Y. i44<i1873).
'Hall & Brown Wood Working Mach. Co. v. Haley Furniture Mfg. Co.,
supra.
"White v. King, 53 Ala. 162 (1875); Dunklin v. Harvey, 56 Ala. 177
(1876); Lea v. I. B. Mercantile Co., 147 Ala. 421 (igo6).
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that knowledge, acquired by the agent before the agency existed,
has been in fact communicated to the principal; and the mere presumption that such was the case is hardly sufficient to counterbalance the opportunity afforded the principal to escape the disadvantages which may have arisen from contracts made by his
agent, which turned out differently than was expected. No
matter how certain it is that the agent knew of material facts
while acting for his principal, the latter is not bound by such notice,
if he can rebut the presumption against him; and, unless this is
a strong presumption, it seems probable that it could be rather
easily overthrown. On the other hand, from the nature of the
case, any evidence to support the presumption is difficult to adduce
in the majority of cases. Once it is established that the agent had
the knowledge while he was acting for his principal, there seems
to be no good reason for 'holding that because he acquired it before
lie became an agent, his principal is only presumptively bound by
it, but that if he had acquired it during the agency, his principal
would be absolutely bound. The fact that the notice was received
by the agent at a different time should only be of weight in
determining whether he had it in mind when acting for the principal; and, it is submitted, the court would have reached a sounder
conclusion, had this view been adopted.
L. C. A.

CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-EMPLOYER'S

LIABILITY

ACT.-The

Federal Employer's Liability Act of 19o8' and the Amendment of
April 5, I9io,2 'have been declared constitutional.3 The act in brief
(I) abolishes the fellow-servant doctrine and (2) restricts the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk in cases
where a common carrier is sued by an employee to recover for injuries sustained while engaged in interstate commerce. It is practically a re-draft of the Act of June II, I9o6, which was condemned because it assumed to regulate intrastate as well as interstate commerce, the valid and invalid portions of the act being inseparable.- The present act avoided this pitfall by express words.
In determining the constitutionality of this act the question
before the court was obviously one of fact. The act, if valid, is
an exercise by Congress of the power to "regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes." 6 Does the abrogation of certain common-law defences in
135

Stat. at Large, 65, ch. i49.

236 Stat. at Large, 65 ch. 143.
'Mondon v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 169 (191i).
4 34 Stat. 232.
SEmployers' Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 (19o7).
'Constitution, Art. I, § 8.
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the class of actions mentioned amount to a "regulation of commerce?"
Commerce has been defined as "commercial intercourse in all
its branches." 7 To regulate means "to prescribe the rules by which
such commerce is to be governed."" This power extends not only
to the subjects and substance of foreign and interstate commerce,
but also to the persons engaged in it and the instrumentalities by
which it is carried on.0 A railroad is such an instrumentality. 0
But the end to be accomplished by the regulation must bear some
real or substantial relation to interstate commerce and the means
adopted must be calculated to further the end sought. The famous
words of Chief Justice Marshall give the test to be applied: "Let
the end be legitimate, let it be \vithin the scope of the constitution and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the spirit and
letter of the constitution, are constitutional." 11
Applying this test to the act in question it would seem that tie
end sought was the facilitation of transportation by"promoting the
safety of those engaged in it. That this is a "legitimate end" has
been established in cases 12 upholding the Safety Appliance Act."
But that Act bore directly on the problem of providing safe modes of
conveyance; the end was legitimate and the "means plainly adapted
to that end." An act regulating the hours of labor for employees
engaged in interstate commerce is also obviously within the range
of federal power.1 4 But do the privileges of the Employer's Liability Act actually contribute to the convenience or safety of passengers, of owners of freight, or of the employee? Is the means
plainly adapted to the end?
It has been said several times that Congress may change the
common law rules of liability between master and servant in respect
to common carriers engaged in interstate commerce. 15 But the only
substantial reason ever advanced to sustain the position is given
'Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824); Swift & Co. v. U. S., 196 U. S.
325"(9o4).

'Marshall, C. J., Gibbons v. Ogden, supra.
'Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U. S. 99 (1876); Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pa.,
114 U. S. 196 (1884); Lottery Cases, 188 U. S. 321 (19o2) ; Northern Securities Co. v. U. S., 193 U. S.197 (903).
" Interstate Com. Com. v. G. H. & UY. R. Co., 167 U. S. 633 (1896);
Ill. Cent. v. IIl., 163 U. S. 142 (1895) ; U. S. v. Geddes, I31 Fed. 452 (1904).
"McCullough v. Md., 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (i819).
'Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., 196 U. S. I (i9o4) ; Schleumner v. Buffalo, Rochester, etc., Ry., 205 U. S. I (1go6).
"27 Stat. 532, c. I96.
z'Balto. & Ohio R. R. v. Interstate Corn. Com., 222 U. S. 612 (19i1).
upholding the Act of March 4, 1907, 34 Stat. at L 1415, ch. 2939; U. S. Comp.
Stat., Supp. 29o9, p. 117o.
1 Johnson v. Southern Pac. Co., supra; Harlan, J., in Peirce v. Van
Dusen, 47 U. S. App. 339 (1897).
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by the court in the principal case. It is this: that the tendency of
the changes prescribed is to impel carriers to take greater care,
thus promoting the safety of the employees and advancing the commerce in which they are engaged. But does not the carrier take
every reasonable precaution to avoid any event tending to interrupt transportation? Every accident occurring in the business of
transportation directly injures that business. The same thing cannot be said of accidents in the business of an employer not operating
a railroad. Carriers prescribe rules and adopt devices calculated to
protect the commerce in which they engage, and those engaged in it.
In the typical case the master has taken every precaution. The
fellow-servant has disobeyed orders or disregarded devices which the
self-interest of the master prompted him to make. It is difficult
to see how this added liability tends to increase the care taken by
the employer. On the other hand in regarding its effect on the conduct of the employee, can it be said that members of a class, influenced by the considerations of class sympathy, will be impelled to
take greater care in their movements in a common occupation in its
nature dangerous, in cases where the liability for injuries sustained
by one member through the negligence of another, is borne by a
second class, than where such liability is borne by the class injured,
i. e., each individual member of it. The fellow servant rule as
originally adopted proceeded on the theory that the servant has
better opportunities than his master of watching and controlling
the conduct of his fellow-servants, and that a contrary doctrine
would encourage negligence.' 6 The later view taken by Chief Justice
Shaw was that the servant had assumed the risk of all dangers inherent in the employment, among them that of negligence of a
fellow-servant. 1 But both of these theories only justify the result
growing out of the idea that a master "cannot be expected to take
more care of the servant than he may reasonably be expected to do
of himself." I That an Employer's Liability Act has the tendency
to impel employees to use greater care toward each other in their
common employments is a proposition not supported by human experience. The arguments against the proposition that the abolition
of the absolute defence of contributory negligence tends to increase
the degree of care exercised by the employer are obvious.
The court cited a decision under the Carmack Amendment 10
to the Hepburn Act 20 as sustaining the proposition advanced. Under
that amendment the initial carrier is made liable for goods lost in
interstate commerce, though lost on connecting lines.21 But this,
" Priestly v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. I (1837).
"Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R. R. Co.. 4 Metc. 49 (Mass. 1842).
" Priestly v. Fowler, supra.
"'June29, 19o6; 34 Stat. at L 584, 595.
"January 4, 1887; 24 Stat. at L. 379.'Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. z86 (igi).
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under the methods in vogue among the carriers, as pointed out in
that decision, was clearly a regulation to protect the shipper and
secure unity of transportation with unity of responsibility. It is
clearly not analogous to the case tinder discussion. The regulation
bears a substantial relation to interstate commerce, but the case does
not stand for the proposition that any absolute liability imposed on
a common carrier for the negligence of its employees is necessarily
so related. On the other hand it has been decided that a statute
making it a crime for a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce to discharge an employee because of his membership in a
labor union is not a "regulation of commerce." 22 It would seem
that "a provision of law which will prevent or tend to prevent the
stoppage of every wheel in every "car,of an entire railroad system
certainly has as direct an influence on interstate commerce as the
way in which one car may be coupled to another or the rule of
liability for personal injuries to an employee." 23 Perhaps there
exist excellent economic reasons for condemning this latter act,
and approving the Liability Act, but it is submitted that this question being one of policy is not for the court in passing on the question of the constitutionality of the act.
It is not doubted that if Congress could impose the liability in
question, it has the power to prohibit any contract in evasion of it,
and the provision of the act declaring such contract void is not
repugnant to the Fifth Amendment as an interference with the
liberty of contract.2 4
E. H. B., Jr.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF A STATUTE REGULATING
THE ASSIGNMENT OF WAGES.-AMoved by the dishonest and oppres-

sive tactics of persons who made a business of lending money on
the security of wages and salaries, the Massachusetts legislature
passed an act,' which makes invalid as against the employer of the
assignor, any assignment of, or order for, wages to be earned in the
future, given to secure a loan of less than two hundred dollars,
until the assignment or order be accepted in writing by the employer
and filed, together with the acceptance, with the clerk of the city
or town in the place of residence of the employee. If the person so
assigning his wages is married, the written consent of his wife must
be appended to the assignment.
The state Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this
statute.2 The "loan sharks" whose occupation was thus taken away
'Adair

v. U. S., 208 U. S. 161 (1907).

'Adair v. U. S., supra, dissenting opinion, McKenna,

3., p. 189.

B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549 (I9IO) ; Eddystone
Pipe & Steel Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S. 228 (1899); B. & 0. R Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com., 221 U. S. 612 (i9IO).
'Chicago,

Mass. Laws, igo, Chap. 605, secs. 7, 8.

2Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 200 Mass. 482 (I9WO).
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from them, appealed the case to the Supreme Court of the United
States, where the decision of the Massachusetts court was sustained.'
The protection of the wage-earner in his relations with his employer has been a fruitful subject of legislative enactment and judicial decision. The early attitude of the courts seems to have been
that the liberty to contract, impliedly protected by the Constitution, could not be infringed even by legislation looking to the welfare of the laborer. The question has frequently come up under
statutes regulating the hours of work, and the manner of paying
wages earned. Different states have reached opposite conclusions
on the same questions. A requirement that wages be paid in money
and not in company store orders, was held unconstitutional in Illinois 4 and in Pennsylvania ;s but in Indiana 6 and West Virginia 7 such
a regulation was declared valid. The same diversity of opinion is
found on the constitutionality of a requirement that wages be paid
semi-monthly.8 Other conflicts on similar questions might be mentioned.
The United States Supreme Court has shown a remarkable
uniformity in holding constitutional state laws regulating the manner of earning, and the mode of paying and receiving wages. In
Holden v. Hardy,9 and in Muller v. Oregon, 10 the regulation of the
hours of labor for men and women was upheld. In Knoxville Iron
Co. v. Harbeson, 1" a requirement that wages be paid in money was
held valid. In McLean v. Arkansas, 2 the court, in passing on the
constitutionality of a law requiring that wages paid to miners be
determined by the weight of the coal at the mouth of the pit,
took a position adverse to the decisions of the courts of Illinois."
In recent years the legislatures of various states have extended
their regulation of wages and salaries so as to protect their receipt.
The pernicious and improper activities of men who, having lent
money at usurious rates, have taken assignments of future wages as
security, have been so extensive as to require some restrictive regulation. Acting under the police power to promote the welfare and
happiness of their citizens, the legislatures have declared such
'Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 74 (1911).
'Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171 (1892).
'Godcharles v. Wigiman, 113 Pa. 43I (1886).
'Handcock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366 (1889).
'State v. Coal-Co., 36 W. Va. 8o2 (1892), reversing State v. Goodwill,
33 W. Va. 179 (i889).
'Lawrence v. Rutland R. R. Co., 8o Vt. 370 (i9o7) ; Republic I. & S. Co.
v. State, i6o Ind. 379 (19o).
9 169 U. S. 366 (1898).
202o8 U. S. 412 (19o8).
i183 U. S. 13 (i9o).

U. S. 539 (1909).
"Ramsey v. People, 142 Ill. 380 (1892).
1211
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assignments void, unless executed with formalities somewhat similar to those required by the Massachusetts statute in question in
the principal
Whether case.
or not such acts of legislatures are a permissible infringement of the. free right to contract, is a question which must
be decided with due regard to the magnitude of the evil to be corrected and the reasonableness of the means used for that purpose,"'
The courts have long since receded from the position which the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania took in 1886,15 when it held that an
act to compel the payment of wages in cash was "an insulting
attempt to put the laborer under legislative tutelage, which is not
only disgracing to his manhood, but subversive of his rights as a
citizen of the United States." In fact, the same court, only one year
later, held,18 even without legislative enactment, that an assignment
of future earnings by one not under contract is so opposed to public
policy as to be void. The court shows that if such assignments were
held good, necessity or inclination for present comforts would induce the wage-earner into an improvident mortgage of his future.
The effect of this upon society would be worse than if the man had
sold himself into slavery, for the slave has at least the incentive of
the driver's whip to keep him at work, while the man, whose wages
are sure to be taken before he receives them, has no incentive to labor
at all.
The courts of other states have held constitutional legislative acts
declaring assignments made without certain formalities void for
similar reasons, without referring very strongly to the elements of
dishonesty and oppression inherent in the transactions of the persons lending money on such assignments. 1 7 On the other hand, the
courts of Illinois have consistently held that the free right to contract may not be infringed even when the legislature has thought
that freedom to make certain contracts was detrimental to the individual contracting, and to society as a whole. This attitude is seen
in Massie v. Cessna, 8 where an act similar to the Massachusetts
statute was held unconstitutional. The act applied to all assignments of wages and salaries, and the opinion of the court intimated
that an act limited to wages and low salaries, which are most in need
of protection, might be enforced. From this concession to the weight
of authority two judges dissented, but their position is hardly tenable
after the decision by the United States Supreme Court.
L.P.S.
"Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U. S. 128 (i91O).
" Godcharles v. Wigiman, 113 Pa. 431 (i886).
11L V. R. R. v. Woodring, ix6 Pa. 513 (1887).
" International Text Book Co. v. Weislinger, i6o Ind. 349 (igoq).
19239 IlL 352 (09og).

NOTES
EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTION AS TO FOREIGN LAws.-In the case
of Cuba Ry. Co. v. Crosby,' the United States Supreme Court lays
down the rule that no presumption will be indulged as to foreign
laws which would govern the case before the court. Foreign laws
must be proved in the forum. The court refused to entertain any
presumption as to the law of Cuba regarding the effect of a promise
by the master to repair defective machinery, upon the assumption
of risk by the servant. There seems to be no precedent in the
Supreme Court upon the exact point, and in view4 of the existing
law of the former in disregard of the foreign law.
much beyond its facts.
It is well settled that a court cannot take judicial notice of a
foreign law, 2 though it may recognize the general system upon which
the laws of that country are based.3 When, therefore, an act that is
governed by foreign law is tried in another court, that court has
three alternatives. It may (I) indulge in a presumtion as to the
foreign law; (2) refuse any such presumption; 4 or (3) apply the
law of the forum in disregard of the foreign law.
(I). In adopting some presumption the courts have several
courses open to them. They may, because of the inherent justice
of the particular right asserted, assume that it exists in the foreign
country because of the strong probability that it is*recognized in all
civilized communities.5 For instance, it would be absurd to hold
that a man could not recover for an aggravated assault under any
system of jurisprudence. The court may, in the absence of proof,
presume that the common law is in force in the foreign country."
It will be noticed that this presumption can only be adopted in certain cases where the court has already taken judicial notice that
the common law is in force in that foreign country, and hence the
presumption is merely that the common law of that foreign country
has not been changed by statute. Many courts indulge the presumption that the foreign law is the same as the law of the forum,
whether it be common law 7 or statutory," and irrespective of
132 Sup. Ct. Rep. 132 (I912).

'Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co.,

129 U. S. 397 (1888).
' Banco de Sonora v. Bankers' Mutual Casualty Co., 95 N. W. 232 (Iowa,

1903).

'See note to Parrot v. Mexican Ry., 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 261.
'Denio, J., in Whitford v. Panama Ry., 23 N. Y. 465 (1861): "In the
absence of positive evidence as to the laws of another country, our laws
indulge in certain presumptions. Prima facie a man is entitled to personal
freedom and the absence of bodily restraint, and to be exempt from physical

violence to his person everywhere."
'Dempster v. Stephen, 63 I1. App. 126 (I8.5).
'Whidden v. Seelye, 40 Me. 247 (1855).

'Prince de Beam v. Winans, III Md. 434 (i9o9).
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whether the system of law of the foreign country be common law'
or otherwise. 10
(2). If the court refuses to make any presumption whatever
as to the substantive law of the foreign country, the question becomes a purely procedural one, it being part of the burden upon
the party having the affirmative to prove the foreign laws. This
was the course pursued in our principle case, the court justifying
itself on the ground that the injury was not one for which recovery
could surely be had as a fundamental principle of justice. The
law involving the effect of a master's promise to repair is at all
times a complicated and difficult question. The court further says:
"The only justification for allowing a party to recover when the
cause of action arose in another civilized jurisdiction is a wellfounded belief that it was a cause of action in that place. The
right to recover stands upon that as its necessary foundation. It is
part of the plaintiff's case, and if there is a reason for doubt he
must allege and prove it." 1
(3). Many courts in refusing to make any presumption simply
apply the law of the forum, as the only law before the court, on
the theory that the parties by failing to prove the foreign law, have
tacitly agreed to abide by the law of the forum.1 2 This theory has
perhaps a broader application than any of the others since under
it, it is unnecessary to consider what system of law is in vogue in
the foreign country. Although the practical result in many cases
is the same under this theory as where the court raises the presumption that the foreign law is the same as the law of the forum,
yet the two must not be confused, as they are founded on distinct
lines of reasoning.
It is exceedingly difficult, owing to the confusion in the cases,
to formulate any majority rule. It would seem, however, that where
the foreign country is a common law jurisdiction, the presumption
that it is in force there is usually the rule of the court; and where
the jurisdiction is not common law, opinion is equally divided among
the other alternatives. In our principle case the court, having
recognized that Cuba was a civil law country, could not presume
that the case would be governed by common law principles. Having
further decided that the act complained of was not one inherently
the subject of relief, they were compelled to choose between two
rules. They took the position that it was a procedural necessity
that the plaintiff prove the foreign law. Whether correct or not,
there is abundant authority in support of the decision and the case
seems to definitely settle the position of the Supreme Court on the
subject.
C. H. S. Jr.
'Wickersham
10

v. Johnston, io4 Cal. 4o7 (I894).

Prince de Beam v. Winans, iii Md. 434 (909).

"Mr. Justice Holmes, p. 133.
"Panska v. Davis, 31 Tex. 67 (i868).

NOTES
WILLS-THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE.-The Supreme Court
of the United States recently held I that, where the testator, after
directing that the proceeds of the sale of the .residue of his real
estate should be divided among his heirs share and share alike,
directed that the share of one son should be paid to trustees and
by them invested, "the income therefrom to be paid the son, the
principal to be paid to his heirs after ,his death," the rule in
Shelley's Case 2 did not apply..
The rule in Shelley's Case provides that "when the ancestor
by any gift or conveyance takes an estate of freehold, and in the
same gift or conveyance an estate is limited, either mediately or
immediately to his heirs in fee or in tail, always in such cases 'the
heirs' are words describing the extent or quality of the estate
conveyed, and not designating the persons who are to take it." 3
In order that the rule may apply, the ancestor must take an estate
of freehold by the same assurance which contains the limitation
to his heirs; the word "heirs" must be used in its full legal
sense; the interest limited to the ancestor and that to his heirs must
be of the same quality; and the estate of the heirs must be by way
of remainder. If the rule is applicable it is not one to be used
by the courts simply as an aid in ascertaining the intention of
the testator, but is a rule of property and prevails in spite of any
contrary intention.4
The great confusion in the cases in which the rule in Shelley's
Case has been discussed, is due to the difficulty in determining
whether the situation is one to which the rule should be applied, and
not to any misconception of what the rule or its effect is. There
are always several preliminary questions to be decided before
applying the rule. In the principal case 5 the problem was whether
the word "heirs" was used in its technical sense as designating those
who were to take from generation to generation, or descriptive of a
class taking from the testator directly. If the testator uses the
word "heirs" without any qualifying words, it will be presumed
that he intended to use it in its strict technical meaning as a word
of limitation, and the rule will apply.8 The burden is on those
who contend that the word "heirs" is used as a word of purchase.7
There is no definite rule of law to govern the interpretation of the
'Vogt v. Graff, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep.
2 Coke, *94 (1581).

134 (90ii).

'Note 29 L. R. A. (N. S.) 963, at page 971.
4
Shapley v. Diehl, 203 Pa. 566 (19o2). There a few cases in which
this rule is treated as one of construction. Smith v. Hastings, 29 Vt. 24o
(1857); Zavitz v. Preston, 96 Iowa, 52 (1895).
'Vogt v. Graff, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 134 (19I).
'Hileman v. Bauslaugh, 13 Pa. 344 (185o); Duffy v. Jarvis, 84 Fed. 731

(1898).

'Appeal of Guthrie, 37 Pa. 9 (186o); Jesson v. Wright, 2 Bligh 57 (Eng.
1820); Daniel v. Whartenby, 17 Wall. 639 (1873).
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intention of the testator. Each case must necessarily stand on its
own facts and the language of the whole will must be taken into
consideration. There is no uniformity of opinion as to the effect
of the use of certain qualifying words or clauses. Some courts
have held that the words "at his death" show an intention to limit
the time of distribution to a definite time rather than to permit
the property to descend in the regular course from generation to
generation." In other cases they have been considered as of no
significance.9 If from the whole will it appears that the word
"heirs" was used to designate a particular individual or a particular class of objects, the rule does not apply.'0
The decision of the court in Vogt v. Graff 11 was based on the
finding that the testator had manifested an intention, by the express
wording of his will, to use the word "heirs" as descriptive of a
particular class of individuals who were to take as purchasers from
him. Even if the court had decided that the word "heirs" was
used in its technical sense, the rule in Shelley's Case could not have
been applied. The remainder and the prior estate of freehold can
coalesce in the ancestor and give him a fee, only when the twa
estates are of the same quality: either both must be legal or both
equitable.12 If the estate of the ancestor is equitable and that of
the heir legal, the rule cannot be applied. 3
R. B. W.

3Foxwell v. Craddock, i Patton & H. 25o (Va. 1855); Smith v. Smith,
8 Ont. Rep. 677 (885).
'Pierce v. Pierce, 14 R. I. 514 (1885).
"Belcher's Estate, 211 Pa. 615 (19o5); Kemp v. Reinhard, 228 Pa. r43

(gio); Hall v. Gradwohl, 113 Md. 293 (191o).
"32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 134 (1911).
1Van
Grutten v. Foxwell, 77 L. T., N. S. 17o (1892).
"SRife v. Geyer, 59 Pa. 393 (1868); Green v. Green, 23 Wall. 486 (1874);
Eshback's Est., 197 Pa. r53 (1900).

